ways were detrimental to the stability of the Roman Empire. Several rulers of the Severan dynasty can be blamed for various actions, but arguably the roots of the problem went deeper, i.e., to the economic, social and political foundations of the Roman world. Some scholars have thought that the Antonine plague affected these foundations so deeply that Rome started to decline after the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The discussion in this paper will focus on the decades preceding and immediately following Marcus' reign, down to the end of the Severan dynasty; thus the military anarchy of the mid-third century will not concern us here.
The interest in the effects of the Antonine plague is not new in Roman history. While it played no role in Gibbon's work, already Niebuhr considered it to have had serious effects on the Roman empire, especially in the cultural sphere.
3 Another notable scholar with a similar view was Seeck. 4 The title of Boak's work on manpower shortage signals a similar approach, 5 while Mazzarino considered the plague and the wars under Marcus as the origin of the economic crisis of Rome. 6 Rostovzeff, on the other hand, considered the plague on a par with foreign wars, poverty, and rebellion, and vehemently denied that depopulation would have constituted a factor in the weakening of the empire. He saw the roots of the crisis in a social upheaval in which the soldiery destroyed the bourgeois elite of the Roman world. 7 The recently discovered notes from Mommsen's lectures on Roman imperial history from 1883 show him to have been similarly brief on the plague and its effects. 8 He, like Rostovzeff later on, for the most part blamed political events for the budding crises under the Severans: "Lastly, there were the evil effects of incessant military insurrections. 6 S. Mazzarino, La À ne del mondo antico (1959 ( , reprint Milano 1988 M.I. Rostovzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford 1957 2 ), 371, 374-375, and at 495: "Now, no political aim was at stake: the issue between the army and the educated classes was the leadership of the state (. . .) Such was the real meaning of the civil war of the third century. The army fought the privileged classes, and did not cease À ghting until these classes had lost all their social prestige and lay powerless and prostrate under the feet of the half-barbarian soldiery". 8 Th. Mommsen, A History of Rome under the Emperors (Th. Wiedemann (ed.), translation C. Krojzl, London and New York 1996), 342. How is a state to thrive when it changes its rulers by force every À ve years on average?".
9
In the past decades the 'third-century crisis' has been the object of several monographs. The view of contemporaries such as Herodian and St. Cyprian have been analyzed by Alföldy. 10 Other contemporary sources, such as some of the Oracula Sibyllina, were once discussed by Mazzarino, 11 and have received major attention from Strobel, who argues that the Eighth Oracle was written around 175 C.E. in Asia Minor.
12 It is interesting to see that, among the many signs of impending doom, the author of the oracle singles out famine and war, but pays very little attention to disease, which really ought to have devastated many communities in Asia Minor for a decade already, if the worst scenarios of the Antonine plague are to be believed. Indeed no major consequences are attributed to the plague by Strobel, who is altogether reluctant to talk about a 'third-century crisis'. 13 Similarly Christian Witschel argues that the empire was so diversiÀ ed that it is wrong to talk about a 'third-century crisis', while there were "numerous smaller crises which occurred regularly in pre-industrial times, such as failed harvests, famines, plagues, earthquakes, and the revolts which could result". 14 In two recent authoritative collective enterprises the picture is more varied. First, in his contribution to the Storia di Roma, Elio Lo Cascio attributes great importance to the plague (both the Antonine one and a number of subsequent epidemics): the death-rate rose to 20% over a twenty-year period, and it would have taken the empire over seventy-À ve years to recover this loss of manpower, even if no other crises had intervened (which they did). From here stem the problems in recruiting 20 Bagnall had at his disposal just over À fty sources with information on land prices for the three À rst centuries C.E. (mostly dating to 80-200 C.E.), an amount of data that probably will not impress many modern historians. Yet here, as so often in ancient history, the well-known dictum of Sir Ronald Syme comes in handy: "One uses what one has, and there is work to be done". 21 Bagnall's overall verdict was the modest claim that he had "lesser ambitions than either corroborating or undermining the model [of Scheidel, Chr.B.] as a whole", while offering "more in the direction of undermining it". 22 In general, Bagnall's contribution was much concerned with how to construe tables properly and how to present and interpret the statistical evidence, as well as with Scheidel's use of À gures found in earlier research, which he simply reproduced "with no critical examination". 23 None of these features are unimportant, it seems to me.
A set of data that so far has not been used in the debate about the Antonine plague in Egypt concerns the reports of failed Á ooding of farmland by the Nile ('abrochia'). The material has been conveniently collected by Wolfgang Habermann and the almost 70 reports have the following chronological distribution: There is more material that can be put to use, though. One should note the remarkable fact that the all-encompassing statistical survey of the remaining papyrological material (some 35,000 texts) presented by W. Habermann, 'Zur chronologischen Verteilung der papyrologischen Zeugnisse', Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 122 (1998), 144-160, has not played any role in the argument of those who propound dramatic consequences of the Antonine plague. Habermann presented the surviving sources from the 2nd century (p. 151-152): evidence from the Arsinoite nomes peaked in the 150s C.E.; in the 160s it returned to the level of the 140s. The material from all the other nomes peaks in the 110s, and is then roughly evenly spread until 200 C.E. Obviously a more detailed analysis of the material might be worth while. It is easy to discern a pattern here. The reign of Marcus Aurelius was exceptionally heavily affected according to the reports on uninundated farmland, while further concentrations appear in the early 190s and in the À rst À ve years of the 3rd century. It would surely be tempting to connect these reports to the Antonine plague and its sequels -on the grounds that the rampant plague would have prevented work on the dikes and other operations necessary for an even Á ooding -were it not for the fact that the À rst peak in our data comes already in 163-164 C.E. Since the plague as far as we know did not reach Egypt before 165 C.E., this removes the 'abrochia'-reports from the discussion, except for the fact that the difÀ culties in irrigating their farmland that Egyptian peasants experienced in the period 163-171 C.E. must surely be taken into account when debating the reason for changes in the Egyptian economy and population during those years.
The Black Death as a model for crisis
It is notable that Scheidel does in fact not connect the woes of Egypt (or Italy) to the 'third-century crisis', even though he postulates a 'lasting consequence' of the plague, in combination with later plagues under Commodus and in the third century. 25 He does, however, use the European Black Death from 1348 onwards as a model for the investigation of the Antonine plague in Egypt, and this comparative zum 65. Geburtstag (Pharos IX, St. Katharinen 1997), 213-283, especially 223-226. In the presentation to follow I exclude a handful of reports that cannot be securely dated to a particular year. 25 Scheidel 2002, op. cit. (n. 2) , 108.
perspective is a major aspect in all recent scholarship on the Antonine plague. As is well known, the effects of the Black Death were beneÀ cial for those individuals who survived and for the following generations, insofar as real wages tended to rise. There was almost everywhere a lack of labourers, and thus wages rose quicker than prices (there was less demand -even if at À rst prices were high, when production broke down completely), while land rents decreased, as there were fewer peasants to work the land.
26
Against this background of the Black Death model, one might even say that it is no surprise if no connection is made between the Antonine plague and the troubles of the third century, as the plague could be said simply to have carried out a necessary 'Malthusian' purge. The empire should have been expected to recover and rise, stronger than ever, as in the 1300s, when the plague struck not only once, but repeatedly and during a long period. Yet the Black Death and its sequels did not prevent the Italian Renaissance from taking hold, nor did it prevent the new ideas and modes of behaviour from spreading, or the Italian city-states such as Florence and Milan from growing to become some of the leading À nancial powers of the world (or even political and military ones).
27
Now, while Scheidel's statistics from Egypt seem to adher to the expected outcome in many instances, he acknowledges that the model does not quite apply: per capita real income does not seem to have risen. This, it seems to me, again provides food for thought. 27 When students of the Black Death sometimes state that it took more than a century for Europe to return to the pre-plague conditions, they refer to population levels, not to standard of living or general economic strength. 28 and one from myself. 30 Greenberg used more statistical calculations and more sophisticated tables than Scheidel and Richard Duncan-Jones, the scholar whose work had inspired Scheidel's study, and argued that Scheidel's À gures cannot be said to prove what they seem to show: namely, that the Antonine plague had such dire consequences during the succeeding decades. In addition, Greenberg and I both independently reached the conclusion that one cannot prove the effects of the plague by using such one-dimensional tools as Duncan-Jones and Scheidel had marshalled. The same holds true for some inscriptions that have received attention in the most recent past. 31 However, Greenberg never asked one fundamental question: namely how Scheidel arrived at his À gures in the À rst place. Accepting all the data presented by Scheidel, he fell victim to the 'power of numbers and statistics'. My own approach was in part different: ever the positivist, I looked at the primary data Scheidel used, which to be sure he had taken over from the work of other scholars (obviously fully acknowledging this). I believe I was able to show that the À gures were often inaccurate, that the real numbers which can be derived from the sources present a rather different picture, and that as long as we use the method of Duncan-Jones and Scheidel in evaluating epigraphic evidence, we will be unable to prove that the plague had any dramatic negative effect in Rome and Italy.
32
I should reiterate my À rm belief that there was an outbreak of the plague in Italy after 165. Yet I do not think that we can take our late literary sources at face value when they claim that it was the worst ever or that the mortality was enormous. 33 More sophisticated and holistic methods must be devised for using the epigraphic evidence, which is 29 J. Greenberg, 'Plagued by doubt: reconsidering the impact of a mortality crisis in the 2nd c. 34 Duncan-Jones went over the same evidence again in 1996 in perhaps his most substantial contribution to this debate, reading much more into the same texts, 35 but his argument does not quite convince.
On the other hand, with so few data, there may be a temptation to forego the primary sources altogether and simply work with comparative models, be they demographic or economic. Models are obviously good to think with, but still I believe that ancient history stands or falls with its primary sources.
In what follows, I shall examine closely some of the evidence presented by Duncan-Jones and Scheidel for the serious effects of the plague in Italy, evidence that has not yet received the proper critical scrutiny.
36 My purpose here is partly methodological: to illustrate how allegedly authoritative numbers used in the debate about the Antonine plague really originated. in terms of surviving evidence. Fig. 11 shows a complete blank for the period 161-192, i.e., no imperially À nanced buildings were constructed in Italy under Marcus and Commodus. The absolute numbers can roughly be gauged from the bars in Duncan-Jones' graph but they are nowhere mentioned in the 1996 paper. One has to turn to DuncanJones' Structure and Scale (1990) for conÀ rmation, and there one will À nd the following results: 38 Unfortunately not even Duncan-Jones gave references to the individual sources on which his bar-graph was based. There is a general reference to Hélène Jouffroy's work from 1986, which in some thirty pages records the evidence for public building in Italy during the second century up to the end of the reign of Commodus.
A case study: building inscriptions in Italy during the second century

39
A perusal of the substantial lists in Jouffroy's book raises a number of methodological questions. According to my calculation, she included some 130 buildings built or repaired in Italy from Trajan to Commodus, 40 while Duncan-Jones' table above contains only half of that, a mere 38 non-imperial and 24 imperially À nanced public buildings, which gives a total of 62 items for a period of over 110 years. Anyone wanting to reduplicate Duncan-Jones' survey of Jouffroy's data (which ideally should be possible) faces serious methodological problems, having 38 See R.P. Duncan-Jones, Structure and Scale in the Roman Imperial Economy (Cambridge 1990) Duncan-Jones declared that the bars in his graph recorded 'building dedications', which patently means that only epigraphical evidence could be included. 42 Archaeological material such as (4) is consequently excluded, and so too presumably are literary sources such as (1), and evidence lacking a precise date. This essential information was lost in the transition and is no longer stated in the 1996 paper which only refers to 'public buildings' and 'imperially À nanced buildings', nor hence in Scheidel's 2002 article.
That leaves the question, how to deal with buildings that are not precisely dated to a particular reign by Jouffroy. While my survey turned up about ten non-imperial or imperial buildings dated under Marcus (against À ve listed by Duncan-Jones), there are another sixteen that are dated 'mid-second century', 'last third of the 2nd c.', 'third quarter of the 2nd c.', 'before 200', and so on. This is not the right place for an in-depth and properly footnoted survey of Jouffroy's data -which is in any case in part outdated (see next paragraph) and in part less than completely accurate 43 -but it is important to realize the limitations of the information that Duncan-Jones extracted from Jouffroy's lists. As is evident, Horster's research presents some differences compared to Duncan-Jones' table, but again the quantity of the material is not very large. The one outstanding feature is the enormous activity under Hadrian (some 30% of all the dated projects belong to his reign), but otherwise the material lends itself to a number of different conclusions, depending on the pattern one wants to see and the periods one construes. For example, one might wonder at the exiguous number of projects in the later Julio-Claudian period (only two in over thirty years after A.D. 37), at the record activity under Vespasian and Titus (at least thirteen projects in twelve years), at the passivity during the following almost four decades (only seven projects from 81 to 117), and so on. But of course these observations are arbitrary and different periodizations would produce different impressions; my point is to underline the fragility of this kind of proof by statistics. And here I will not even go into the question of the 'epigraphic habit', imperial self-gloriÀ cation, damnatio memoriae and other essential factors that inÁ uence the composition of the epigraphic record. However, the dearth of projects under Marcus is still quite noteworthy, and the difference compared to his predecessor cannot be denied, although Pius in many cases had the advantage of À nishing projects that Hadrian had begun.
47
Some observations by Horster are important in this context. The concept of 'Sättigung an Gebäuden', i.e. the possibility that local needs had already been satisÀ ed, should not be forgotten when explaining Á uctuations in public building. 48 Public building is certainly not always driven by rational causes, but after the surge under Hadrian the needs may have been less pressing (even though, ideally, repair works ought surely to have been undertaken in the 160s-170s on buildings erected under Hadrian or before). More importantly, Horster reaches the conclusion that no conscious imperial building policy can be discerned in Italy. The emperors mostly reacted to special needs of one kind or another.
49 Therefore, if Marcus' attention was taken up by his wars, as it surely was, it is only to be expected that there should be less public building in Italy sponsored by imperial funds.
To sum up so far: The information we have about the Antonine plague does not warrant the conclusion that it was of such a magnitude that by itself it would have had catastrophic consequences for the Roman world. There were other factors, though, that created problems for the empire: foreign enemies and long-term social and economic developments, for instance. The Antonine plague on its own cannot explain the 'third-century crisis', of whatever nature it was.
The plague and the debate about slavery in Italy
There is a further question for which the Antonine plague is also allegedly quite important. The research of Elio Lo Cascio has tied the plague to a speciÀ c aspect of the 'third century crisis' -the fate of slavery in Italy.
Scholars interested in determining the population of ancient Italy are engaged in two related debates which concern the overall population of Italy and the slave population of Italy (and the whole empire). Details concerning the debate are presented elsewhere in the volume; sufÀ ce it to say here that a crucial question is how to interpret the Augustan census À gures, around 4 million in 28 B.C.E. and 4.9 million in 14 C.E. 50 This represents an astonishing growth since 70 B.C.E. (910,000). No demographic model can account for such an enormous growth by natural means. Is it therefore the case that the Augustan À gures include women and children? Many scholars are of that opinion. Lo Cascio considers such a proposition impossible, with some good arguments, explaining the higher À gures as the product of a more efÀ cient census and new grants of citizenship. 51 The high population estimate for imperial Italy proposed by Lo Cascio, some 12 million, has a certain relevance for another lively current debate, the one about the number of slaves in the Roman world. Prominent participants in this debate include Walter Scheidel and William Harris. Scheidel argues that slave breeding was the only way in which the slave population could have maintained itself demographically during the empire, when slaves may have constituted 10% of the population. Harris argues that for keeping the numbers of slaves stable other sources of supply were important and probably equally important as breeding: in particular infant-exposure, but also import across the borders, piracy, and so on. His estimate of the slave population is closer to 15%-20% of the total.
Empire was in fact higher. 53 If scholars assume six million slaves under Marcus Aurelius, against 54 million free individuals, 54 then it may well be that the pool from which to recruit enough slaves to keep the servile population stable was not large enough. By assuming, however, that the free population was considerably larger, for instance comprising some twelve million in Italy alone, six million slaves in the empire at large will make up a much smaller group as a percentage of the total population, and the pool from which to recruit new slaves (foundlings, victims of kidnapping, etc.) is hence concomitantly larger. 55 As is evident, this is no ad hoc solution by Lo Cascio; it derives directly from his view on the size of the citizen body and the Italian population under Augustus and the succeeding dynasties.
Assuming a larger total population of the Roman world than some other scholars do is certainly one way of solving the problem with the stability of the slave population. It is a solution which also interestingly assigns less importance to slave labour during the À rst two centuries C.E. than is customary.
But one problem, it seems to me, is that the high population À gures have to come down eventually. I doubt that one can argue for such a large overall population of the Roman world in the later 2nd century and during the difÀ cult years of the 3rd century. In order for Lo Cascio's model to make sense, the numbers must decline, and this is where the Antonine plague is important. The plague provides a logical reason for why the large population of the À rst century B.C.E. is much reduced some two centuries later. and, as a consequence, it becomes more difÀ cult to argue for quite as large a population of slaves in Roman society as is sometimes done.
The Antonine plague indeed represents a crucial question at the intersection of debates about the 'third-century' crisis, the Roman population, and even the size of the slave population.
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